CONFLICT OF USER RIGHTS AND STATE INTERESTS IN COLLECTING DIGITAL EVIDENCE FROM SOCIAL NETWORKS: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47390/ydif-y2025v1i11/n11Keywords:
social networks, digital evidence, privacy, data protection, state security, judicial oversight, international law, GDPR.Abstract
This article analyzes the conflict between user rights and state security interests in collecting digital evidence from social networks from an international legal perspective. The research was conducted through comparative analysis of legislation in the United States, the European Union, and Uzbekistan, examination of international judicial practice, and collection of empirical data. The results show that the US employs a warrant mechanism, the European Union applies strict standards based on GDPR, while Uzbekistan relies on prosecutor's sanctions as primary safeguards. The study identified that Uzbekistan's legislation lacks adequate regulation of precise procedural procedures for evidence collection from social networks, transparency requirements, independent oversight mechanisms, and user notification procedures. The article develops concrete recommendations for harmonizing Uzbekistan's legislation with international standards, adopting special legislation, and establishing an independent supervisory body.
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